Es mostren els missatges amb l'etiqueta de comentaris Psychoanalysis. Mostrar tots els missatges
Es mostren els missatges amb l'etiqueta de comentaris Psychoanalysis. Mostrar tots els missatges

08 de març 2014

Psychoanalysis, Science and the Real















— “Psychoanalysis is not a science”.*
This was Jacques Lacan’s statement in 1975 in his visit to the United States, in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology[1]. He reached this conclusion after some decades of having referred psychoanalysis to the field of science, first by means of linguistics and anthropology, and later through of mathematics and logics. Sigmund Freud always thought psychoanalysis had his references in the field of natural sciences, as psychoanalysis itself had emerged as a consequence of these sciences, as a practice derived from medicine. It was in the 50’ and 60’ that Jacques Lacan linked psychoanalysis, in an epistemological break with natural sciences, to the field of structural anthropology and linguistics, using the work of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, and sometime after to mathematics and logics. Psychoanalysis would be then a science homologue to the field and function of logics, a field that he could define as a “science of the real”. 
But Jacques Lacan added something else in his well-known Seminar during those same years —Psychoanalysis is not a science, it’s a practice that deals with something real, a real that is different from the real that science deals with.[2] Therefore, following this statement, the question may be posed: Which is the real that science deals with, and which is this other real psychoanalysis deals with? And which is the relation between them, if there is any? This will be, on the other hand, the theme of the next international Congress of the World Association of Psychoanalysis to be held in Paris this coming April, with the promising title: “A Real for the XXIth Century”. I hope to shed some light upon this question today.


Different reals

First of all, we have to distinguish two registers that can be never confused, neither in science nor in psychoanalysis: the real is not reality. In fact, even the Physics of our days underlines this distinction as necessary in order to construct its object and its practice. The progress of science itself has been founded in this distinction: the real calculated and constructed by science has nothing to do ultimately with the reality of matter. As Jacques-Alain Miller pointed out in the presentation of the Congress theme: “it has not been possible to make an equivalence between the real and the matter; with subatomic Physics, the levels of matter multiplies”. And we must say that the determinate article The in the expression ‘The matter’ doesn’t exist as a universal thing, that “The matter, like the universal article of The woman, vanishes”[3]. You know perhaps the surprising statement by Jacques Lacan in the 70’: “The Woman [as a universal] doesn’t exist”, there is only one woman, another woman, and another woman, they must be taken one by one but they never make the universal class of The woman. Well, with matter and real in science we have the same question: there is no “The matter”. The real conceived and constructed by contemporary science makes matter vanishes in bits of real, bits that have to be considered one by one.
Therefore, the new epistemology of science states that each science has its own bit of real, different from the bit of real of other sciences.  We may say then, as the Spanish scientist Javier Peteiro states —Javier Peteiro is our respected interlocutor in these questions—, that “there are different ‘reals’, that the Real in Chemistry is not the same Real dealt with in Physics, in Biology or in Anthropology.”[4] For example, the Real of Biology, life itself, is not reducible to Physics. We don’t know yet what this real called “life” is , we have today the same difficulties to define “life” as one thousand years ago. The inaugural text by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, entitled “What is life?” preserves its enigma without a clear answer. Life is not reducible to a combinatorial of atoms, or even a combinatorial of genes that, moreover, are death matter in themselves.
On its part, psychoanalysis conceives life only as phenomena in the field of language, as that specific real that has been called “jouissance”, with the French lacanian word. (There is no accorded translation for this lacanian term, —enjoyment, pleasure, fruition…—, then the best translators as our colleague Bruce Fink, have chosen to let it in French). Life is what makes sign of a pleasure beyond the homeostasis of energy in the universe. Where there is life, there is “jouissance” and there is an imbalance of energy that introduces his opposite in the field of language, that’s to say death. And there is only life and death for a subject of language, for a being affected by this virus, by this parasite —as Lacan said— that is language. Sometimes, scientists are confronted to this real of “jouissance” of life with some anguish, when they find a sign of life that could go beyond its control and that could expand its opposite in death. Therefore, this real thing called “jouissance” is a bit of real between the real in Physics and the real in Biology.
This is an example of the place that psychoanalysis has today in the field of the sciences, “its place among the sciences” as Jacques-Alain Miller said some years ago, in a conference, originally in English, that has been recently published in the Psychoanalytical Notebooks with this title, “Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences”[5]. “Among the sciences” does not mean out of the sciences, it doesn’t mean out of the scientific border but, on the contrary, in the inner part of science itself, in the space between a science and another science, the space in-between, so to speak. Psychoanalysis finds itself, then, just in the place where the sciences find that real that cannot be defined by their concepts, that real that Jacques Lacan introduced in the 60’ with the expression “the subject of science”. The subject of science is precisely the subject psychoanalysis deals with in its practice, it is the subject that makes sign of “jouissance”, of a real that breaks homeostasis in life, the “jouissance” that emerges in the symptom as a malaise.

When we deal with symptom, we deal with this other real that cannot be entirely defined in the scientific field. That is the reason Lacan said that  “psychoanalysis is not a science”, adding, however, that “there isn’t any therapeutic practice that constitutes a science, even medicine is not a science but an art.”[6] When your are dealing with the subject, with the subject of a symptom, with the singularity of symptom in the subject suffering, there isn’t any possible science, there is always an art that cannot be evaluated by scientific method.  We may think perhaps that Lacan had a very high idea of what constitutes a science  and that all his efforts to make psychoanalysis a science were a sort of desperate enterprise. In fact, in another class of his Seminar he repeated this statement: “Psychoanalysis, I have said and I have repeated it recently, is not a science; it has not the status of science and it can only wait for it, expect it”[7]. This would mean that psychoanalysis, —a practice that is a product, an effect of modern science—, is not a science yet, but a practice that it is in the waiting room to be a science among the others, perhaps in this XXI century. This may mean that its constitution as a new science will be sometime operative and that its inclusion in the field of sciences has to change the status of science itself.


The “one by one” method

But, in fact, why psychoanalysis cannot be considered as a science in its modern sense? Is a very simple question, a too simple question at a first glance. Scientific method, following the natural sciences since the 17th century, is founded first of all in the quantification of phenomena. Galileo’s principle is in its fundamentals: “Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what it is not”. But how we could make measurable subjective suffering? How we could make measurable the meaning of suffering and malaise, the subjective meaning of a symptom, even the meaning of an experience, a significant event in subjects life? When you take this scientific principle and you make it extensive to the entire field of subjective suffering you reach an absurd thinking. Is the absurd of questionnaires, labeled sometimes as “scientific”, with questions like this one:  “Have you felt happy in the past 7 days? Check the answer in the scale from 1 to 10.” (It’s a true example that you can find in the so called “scientific questionnaires”). No, you cannot make measurable the meaning of a subjective experience; there is a profound mistake in this extension of scientific method that reaches what is called, by scientific thinking itself, scientism. Scientism is the belief in the universal applicability of scientific method, as quantification, to all human phenomena. When you deal with a subjective experience you cannot take this principle as a guide.
But there is a more evident argument to say that psychoanalysis is not a science, following the conditions of modern scientific method. This method requires at least the condition of reproducibility of an experience or study under the same conditions and obtaining the same results. The condition of reproducibility is in fact an ideal condition, and there are a lot of scientific theories that are considered as operative in science that cannot be tested by reproducing the experience that would confirm them.
But how could you reproduce the experience of a psychoanalytical session, or a psychoanalytical interpretation? It’s completely impossible. When you deal with the subject of the unconscious, you deal with a real that cannot be reproduced. You cannot reproduce under the same conditions the unconscious formations that are the emergence of the subject of psychoanalysis; you cannot reproduce under the same conditions a dream and its interpretation, you cannot reproduce under the same conditions a parapraxis, a Freudian slip, or what is more important, you cannot reproduce the effect of a psychoanalytical interpretation itself. The interpretation that has been effective in a case of obsessional neurosis will not necessarily be effective in another case of obsessional neurosis. The psychoanalyst, following Freud’s advices, has to take every case as a whole new case, on by one. Even more, he has to put on hold all he knows about other cases in order to be able to listen to the singularity of that case, that one-off case. This is the reason why we define psychoanalytical clinics as a clinics of “one by one”, that can never be reproduced under the same conditions. Each case has its own demonstration and its own validation by its own effects in the psychoanalytical treatment.
In fact, this is also a question for many of the existing scientific practices. For example, in the field of Pharmacology there are the well-known clinical trials for a drug, the clinical trials designed as randomized, the double blind and placebo-controlled trials, the planned experiments with a trial group and a control group. But, following the remarks of some critic pharmacologists, —specially after the big fiasco in pharmaceutical industry with influenza A virus— the best clinical trial, the most effective and reliable trial is what is called “clinical trial in an only patient”[8]. It consists in the modification, in a systematic form, of the disease treatment in an only patient in a predetermined series of periods. That’s to say, you have to test a drug in an only patient, taken in his singularity, following its effects in an incomparable way, in a “one by one” way. You may say that this method is impossible to follow, too long and too expensive, but in some cases it will be without a doubt the most effective and accurate. In the case of psychoanalytical clinics, where you cannot reproduce the same experience or phenomena under the same conditions it’s the only way to verify the effectiveness of the method and the treatment.


“Truths that only one can see”

Here, I have to make a small parenthesis. A few weeks ago, when I was back in Barcelona working in the development of my speech for today, trying to explain the impossibility of making a replication of the unconscious phenomena and formations, I received, at that very moment, an e-mail from my colleague here in New York, Maria Cristina Aguirre, with a link to a very interesting article published in the New York Times, an article that talks about… replication in science, of course! It was really a surprising coincidence, perhaps an experience of that phenomenon that Lacan evokes as an “encounter with the real”, a real “Tyché”, taking the term from Aristotle, the Goddess of Fortune. It’s kind type of phenomena that interested also Jung, Freud’s dissident pupil, in his interlocution with the Nobel Price in Physics, Wolfgang Pauli. They had even written an interesting text about this phenomenon that they called “synchronicity”, the experience of two or more events without an apparent causal relation. This coincidence is nearly a synchronicity of this type, because the article deals with what is impossible to reproduce in the field of science.
 The article is entitled “New Truths That Only One Can See” and it has a number of interesting remarks about the question of replication or reproducibility at present in sciences. I quote the following paragraph:
“It has been jarring to learn in recent years that a reproducible result may actually be the rarest of birds. Replication, the ability of another lab to reproduce a finding, is the gold standard of science, reassurance that you have discovered something true. But that is getting harder all the time. With the most accessible truths already discovered, what remains are often subtle effects, some so delicate that they can be conjured up only under ideal circumstances, using highly specialized techniques.”[9] Therefore, replication is not really a common practice in present days science. This is not a secondary or a minor problem. One of the most important consequences, as a certain Dr. Ionnidis concludes after some meta-analysis of scientific publications, is that “papers reporting negative conclusions [of the most part of experiences] are more easily ignored”, and he reaches “the conclusion that most published findings are probably incorrect”. The journalist talks about the inevitable “unconscious bias” of scientists that may end in a vicious circle. That, is: the more scientists expect to find specific results and, therefore, they build their research towards that point, the more they find confirmation through replicability methods. The more they find confirmation of their experiments, the more these experiments are published, quoted, and lead the perspective of new research. As a consequence, the perspective of new and different research is set aside. From our perspective, we may say that this constitutes a good example of the massive effects of the suggestion phenomena that psychoanalysis discovers as a part of the transference.  Scientists talk about a “tacit knowledge” in their community that hides the real they are in fact researching. The discovering of a new real in science is then reserved —says the journalist— to “an experiment as unique as a Rembrandt”. Indeed, the real is always “as unique as a Rembrandt”, impossible to reproduce.
There is always something that cannot be reproduced in experience and sometimes that is the most important issue, the issue that could lead towards a true scientific advance. However, that is precisely ignored, even obliterated, in those published researches that confirm each other in a mutual consensus. This issue is precisely what could allow us to catch a bit of the real, that real that always slips from language and from research.
I will close this parenthesis I opened up a few lines above by pointing out that perhaps I may be also under the effect of that “tacit knowledge” that exists in the same manner in the psychoanalytical community, as it exists in each community of knowledge. And maybe this tacit knowledge that exists about the unconscious knowledge among us also hides the real knot, the real point of the unconscious that lays in scientific discourse. In any case, I will say that this nearly synchronicity between my speech and Maria Cristina’s message, with the link to that interesting article, is an event impossible to reproduce, impossible to repeat in a scientific method, as it was also an event impossible to preview. And, in this sense, it is also an encounter with a real, with the real psychoanalysis deals with.


The Freud’s dream in science

If we have to approach the real that makes specific psychoanalysis clinics in the field of science, it’s better to look at the unconscious formations themselves as those phenomena, so singular, that cannot be reproduced in any way. There is an original moment of this encounter with the real of the unconscious that is necessary to remember when we speak about the real, an original moment in the history of science, a moment that is an unconscious formation, a dream of Freud himself, the dream that is also in the origin of his text “The interpretation of dreams”, a text which is in fact the development of this dream. This is a well-known dream entitled “Irma’s injection dream” and it is linked to the question of feminine sexuality,of feminine “jouissance”, a question that has made present a new real in science and in clinics, a new real that cannot be represented as a complete or as a consistent form, because it escapes always to scientific knowledge.
Where is feminine jouissance? It will be always a question with its enigma preserved in the center of knowledge. And it is also the enigma that lies in the center, in the navel of Freud’s dream. It takes place during Freud’s summer holidays, a few days before his birthday, he has just written a rapport about a difficult patient, Irma, a friend of the family and whose treatment has not been successful. Irma is announced to assist at Freud’s birthday party and he doesn’t feel very comfortable with this circumstance, with Irma’s presence, that is also the presence of a symptom in the clinics of female sexuality. That night, from July 23th to 24th, in the year 1895, he has a dream that rests as a real and singular encounter between scientific knowledge and the question about feminine jouissance. I will only quote some phrases of the manifest content of the dream, when Freud meets Irma who complains in the dream that all Freudian solutions had failed to heal his symptoms. At that point, Freud writes:
“I was alarmed and looked at her. She looked pale and puffy. I thought to myself that after all I must have been missing some organic trouble. I took her to the window and looked down her throat, and she showed signs of recalcitrance, like women with artificial dentures. I thought to myself that there was really no need for her to do that. - She then opened her mouth properly and on the right I found a big white patch…”
The dream goes on, but it is in this white patch, in this white spot, —this “grossen weissen Fleck”— where the navel of the dream finds its place, the real point where all of Freud’s free associations stop at. It is in the blank page of this real, so horrible as it appears to Freud, where the chemical formula of trimethylamin appears, —“printed in heavy type”, Freud points out—, a formula of an element linked to sexuality. Trimethylamin was supposed to be a component of semen, and its formula is therefore a writing of sexuality on the blank page, on the white patch in Irma’s throat that is in then center of Freud’s anguish. There are several associations that lead Freud to the question of female sexuality, but also to the question of death.
In any case, we have in this white spot, in this blank page, the point that Freud himself describes as the navel of the dream, the most real point of the dream; we have in this image that rests in the center of Irma’s injection dream an excellent image of the real that escapes to knowledge, a real that is impossible to represent, that is even impossible to write. It is that real that, in Lacan’s expression, does not cease to not be written —with two negatives— does not cease to not be represented. When Lacan tries to formulate the real he doesn’t find a better formula that this one: the real is what does not cease to not write.
And we may conceive the structure of Freud’s discourse, all his elaboration about the unconscious knowledge, as a work-through around this blank page that remains in every field of knowledge. This is in fact the hypothesis of the unconscious, a knowledge that doesn’t know itself and that stands in every knowledge, a knowledge that is heterogeneous in the field of scientific knowledge, the supposed objective knowledge of the real.
Freud’s dream and his formalization with the symbolic laws of the unconscious knowledge emerges therefore as a real point in scientific knowledge, as a real point that was waiting to be inscribed in its field, a real point that does not cease to not be written until the moment of the formation of this dream, when something of this real unconscious ceases to not be written. When the real ceases to not be written, we have a phenomenon of Tyché, an encounter with the real, always as a contingency, never as a necessary law that would be previewed or calculated in advance.


Neuroscience’s dream

This is the real of psychoanalysis and we can now pose the following question: where is this real in our contemporary science? Is it possible to catch it, to find some representation of its impossible writing in the scientific knowledge of present days?
I propose you the reading of an actual reference in the field of neurosciences, the reading of someone that at some point was interested in Freud and that tries to represent the unconscious knowledge in the brain mapping of actual neurosciences. I am referring to Antonio Damasio, the neuroscientist, author of some best-sellers in the diffusion of science, the later one titled Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. In this work, Antonio Damasio proposes a representation, a mapping of the brain, a brain that would be in its turn a mapping of reality, even a mapping of the real. Even if he proposes the idea of mapping only as a useful abstraction, the operation of mapping the brain activity is today a very suggestive procedure widely published in all kinds of press with the coloured images of fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging). All the thinking activity, all the human thoughts could be represented in this brain mapping, even the unconscious thoughts, of course. Even the white patch and the writing of the trymethylamin formula in the Freud’s dream will be mapped. This is the ideal goal of neurosciences: mapping the real of human thoughts.
But the real unconscious is impossible to map, so impossible as the real itself that does not cease to not be written. The real unconscious will always be impossible to map out by a Magnetic Resonance, just as those parts in the ancient maps that were represented as a terra incognita, obscured by clouds, a non explored region where you could only read: hic sunt dracones, there are dragons here, impossible beings, but not so unreal ones. To catch dragons in the terra incognita of the real unconscious, Magnetic Resonance is absolutely useless; you have rather to try with Semantic Resonance, with the resonance that words and language produce in a human being, a talking being.
The most interesting moment in the reading of Antonio Damasio’s book is precisely the chapter dedicated to Freud and the “Freudian unconscious”. We have there the privilege of reading Damasio’s testimony of his own unconscious, as in the Freudian text of “The interpretation of dreams”. Contrary to Freud, Damasio doesn’t extract any consequences of his dreams. In fact, he says that he tries hard to remember them, but unless he writes them down, they vanish. All of them? No, not all of them. There is at least a dream that resists to vanish from the scientific mind of Damasio, “a recurrent soft nightmare” as he writes, an unconscious formation that usually comes to his mind the night before he has to make a speech. Damasio himself confesses  his uneasiness  when someone invites him to give a lecture on the topic of Freud and neuroscience: “It is the sort of assignment one should decline vigorously”, he writes. And then, here is the soft nightmare that disturbs him, with its message of the real unconscious: “The variations always had the same gist: I am late, desperately late, and something essential is missing. My shoes may have disappeared; or my five o’clock shadow is turning into a two-day beard and my shaver is nowhere to be found; or the airport has closed down with fog and I am grounded. I am tortured and sometimes embarrasses, as when (in my dream, of course) I actually walked onstage barefoot (but in an Armani suit). That is why —Damasio adds —, I never leave shoes to be shined outside a hotel room.”[10]
It’s indeed one of those dreams of repetition in which Freud found the presence of the real with its traumatic effects, in a form of a repetition that is always beyond the pleasure principle. Of course, we would need Antonio Damasio’s associations about each element of the dream to develop the semantic resonances that are weaved in the text of his unconscious. But there is something very clear in this text, something that is always missing, that the subject feels like a lack, something lost or disappeared that tortures him. The real unconscious is precisely this lack, this absence, this place impossible to represent in the map, this place where the subject Antonio Damasio is always late, desperately late, too late to say that unconscious will be always absent of the brain mapping. This is the real unconscious that does not cease to not be written, that does not ceased not  be represented, but that insists to be written in the subject’s dream. And how it insists at being represented? It insists at being represented as a lack, as an absence, as a lost, as the lack of shoes that are so present in its absence. —In Spanish we say “brillan por su ausencia”, literally, “they shine through its absence”, and there is no need to let them outside the room to be shined, it’s enough to dream of them as the lack object, as the most real object. The subject misses this object to the extent that he is always late in his meeting with the Freudian unconscious. The real unconscious are these shoes Antonio Damasio fears to loose and that does not cease not to be outside his hotel room every night before his impossible speech, his impossible meeting with the Freudian unconscious.
The shoes of Antonio Damasio are therefore a brilliant image, as any other unconscious formation, as any other symptom, to reveal the real that psychoanalysis has to deal with, the real unconscious that only the subject could decide to decipher. But, of course, to do that it would be necessary first to admit that those shoes, as a symbolic element, are an interesting object to represent the unconscious as a brain.


The red ink of the real

We can go back now to our first question about the unobvious relation between the real of science and the real of psychoanalysis. We can name this relation as the real unconscious that remains among the sciences, among the knowledge of the different sciences. It isn’t indeed an obvious relation because this real always appears as a blank page in the book of science. To make it evident, to give you a short view of this place, I haven’t found a better example than an amusing and brief story that someone called Slavoj Zizek was telling recently, here in Wall Street, to some people, perhaps without extracting the most interesting consequences. The brief story as follows:
“A guy was sent from East Germany to work in Siberia. He knew his mail would be read by censors. So he told his friends: Let’s establish a code. If the letter you get from me is written in blue ink, it is true what I said. If it is written in red ink, it is false. After a month his friends got a first letter all written in blue ink that said: everything is wonderful here. Stores are full of good food. Movie theaters show all sorts of excellent American films. Apartments are large and luxurious. The only thing you cannot buy is red ink.”
Indeed, we lack the red ink to say all the truth, and that is the reason Lacan said that we can only half-speak the truth —to translate Lacan expression “le midire de la vérité”— which is different from saying: to speak half-truths. There is a logic impossibility to say all the truth or all the real, because of the unconscious. We lack the red ink, even to say that what I am saying is false. But truth speaks by itself in what I’m saying, always beyond my conscious will.
Science is based on the belief that one can spell out and write all the real in blue ink, that one can say the truth of the knowledge that is written in the real, without any lack. However, this belief only lasts to point when one realizes that some shoes are definitely lacking, that the red ink will always be lacking in any discourse.
Therefore, I will say as a conclusion that psychoanalysis is the red ink of science, as the subject of unconscious is the red ink of scientific discourse. Both, the real unconscious and psychoanalysis itself are waiting to be written in blue ink. However, we must be careful, if  at anytime that became the case, one would get, as the most important object always lacking to the subject’s desire, only a blank page to be read, —with the semantic resonances that the language offers us in the word “read”.




* Lecture in Barnard College, New York City, February 14, 2014. I thank Howard Rose for his proofreading of this text.




[1] Published in Scilicet nº 6-7. Du Seuil, Paris 1975.
[2] “Une pratique qui joue d’un autre réel” S. XIX, p. 240.
[3] Jacques-Alain Miller, “A real for the XXIth Century”, presentation of the IX Congress of the WAP.
[4] Javier Peteiro, “Lo real sin ley de la ciencia”, contribution to the IX Congress of the Wap.
[5] Jacques-Alain Miller, in Psychoanalytical Notebooks 27, “Science and the Real”, London Society of the Nerw Lacanian School, September 2013. The conference was pronounced in 1988.
[6] In an interview in “Figaro littéraire” by Gilles Lapouge, 1st December 1996, nº 1076.
[7]La psychanalyse, je l'ai dit, je l'ai répété tout récemment, n'est pas une science. Elle n'a pas son statut de science et elle ne peut que l'attendre, l'espérer.” Le Séminaire, libre XXIV, “L’insu que sait de l’une-bévue s’aile à mourre” (inédit).
[8] We refer here to the studies of Joan-Ramon Laporte, director of the Catalan Institute of Pharmacology, “Principios básicos de investigación clínica”, AstraZeneca, Barcelona 2001.
[9] George Johnson, “New Truths Than Only One Can See”, in The New York Times, January 20, 2014.
[10] Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, Ramdom House, New York 2012.

21 de febrer 2014

The Paradoxes of Transference


(Lecture in the 7th Clinical Study Days of The Lacanian Compass, February 15, 2014, New York City)

If we define a paradox as a statement that apparently contradicts itself and yet still might be true, then the concept of transference is the best example of this in the field of psychoanalytical experience*. Transference is both the condition of this experience, and also the most difficult obstacle to overcome. Sometimes it is the most apparent reason for the subject’s cure, the cause of spontaneous therapeutic effects, especially if the analyst doesn’t intercept or block them. Sometimes, however, it is also the reason for the subject’s remaining attached to the secondary benefits of the symptom, according to that phenomenon Freud detected very soon as a “negative therapeutic reaction”.
In fact, any practice in the wide field of therapeutics is aware of this circumstance that psychoanalysis interprets according to the varied effects of transference. When specialist physicians observe that there are a lot of therapeutic effects due to the placebo phenomenon, or due to the mere presence and response of a professional, they verify, even without knowing it, the effects of transference upon the subject. They also verify these effects, moreover, when they complain about the lack of collaboration or about the subject’s negative reaction to the treatment. The problem consists in the attribution of these effects to a distortion, or even a falsification, of the correct and calculated effects of the treatment. The effects of transference, also in what we consider to be suggestion, often occur quietly, secretly, but in full view of everyone.
The first paradox of transference, therefore, is that it acts and works in the clinic like that intriguing object described in Edgar Allan Poe’s tale “The Purloined Letter”, commented on by Jacques Lacan in one of his firsts seminars. Transference is a hidden object that is at the same time in everybody’s view; an object that acts and works as a signifier of that which we don’t know the meaning of, and that secretly determines every character’s fate. Transference is the purloined letter that determines a full range of effects in the everyday clinic.
The merit of having discovered this purloined letter in the clinic, of having discovered the power and the mechanism of the transference phenomenon and of having designated it as an operative concept in the origins of psychoanalysis, clearly falls to Sigmund Freud. Freud also brought into the light of day the secret link between the unconscious and transference.

The Freudian term for transference is Übertragung, which also means translation, transcription, displacement from one point to another. The transference phenomenon was considered at first as a repetition of an original relation, a sort of transcription or translation of an original text. However, the question about what is repeated in transference is not answered as easily as the post-Freudians analysts thought. They reduced transference to a simple repetition of an original object relation, usually the mother-baby relation, which should then be recalled and even corrected in analysis. In the first place, this repetition would have to be interpreted to the subject as such. Lacan criticized this conception of transference as a simplistic reduction.
In fact, in his text “Psychotherapy of Hysteria”, Freud speaks of transference as a “false link” between the patient and the physician. It is a false link because of an unconscious representation that is tied, in its turn, not to an object but to a desire, an unsatisfied desire, a desire that already existed before any object relation was conceived. Transference as a false link with the analyst tells us, therefore, about the truth of an unconscious desire. We can see a new paradox: on the one hand, a false link, on the other, a true desire. The problem is not the supposed object that would be in the original relation, and that the transference phenomenon repeats. The question is the translation, the displacement of an unsatisfied desire, a desire that is always already a translation, a displacement in itself.
That is to say: there is no original text of the purloined letter of transference. The original is already a translation, a transcription of a lost original text, a loss that is desire itself, desire as caused by the lack of the object. If Freud can conceive of transference as a “false link”, this is not because there is an original or true object of desire, but instead because transference is always the question about the desire of the Other. There is no “true link” between the subject and the Other, but instead always a “proton pseudos”, an original lie at the origin of desire, as Freud was taught by the hysterical subject. This “false link”, then, will always be at the center of the question of desire.
And this is the moment when transference emerges as a phenomenon in the treatment, usually as the question about the desire of the Other. The analyst is the one who can assume this question that will constitute a knot in the subject’s relation, not to an original object, but to the unconscious itself.

I will give a short example of this — of transference as the question of the Other’s desire, a question that cannot be reduced and explained as a simplistic repetition of an original object relation.
The first time a young man comes to meet me, he says that he has dreamt of me the very night before he called for an interview. He didn’t know anything about me, except my name. In his dream, he drives me in his car. I am in the back seat. He cannot see my face, a face he doesn’t know and which he tries to discover in the rear-view mirror. There is a moment of anxiety in the dream when he realizes that the other can see him but that he cannot see the other. —What am I in the desire of the Other?— this is the question that will become a central question both in his life and in his analysis, as is the case for everyone. He knows where he is going to, to the analyst’s consulting room, but he doesn’t know where he comes from. At the precise moment when he is telling me about all this, in our very first meeting, and before any intervention on my part, he realizes the following: the problem that has brought him to the analyst is a conflict with his father, a father who was… a taxi driver. At this point, I agree with an emphatic and short intervention: —“Aha!” — “You know, —he adds quoting his father— one can never know who one is driving in the car”. And he is right, especially when the person you are driving in the car is the person to whom you will tell the most secret things of your life, the person you usually have in the back seat when you lie on the couch.
But here we also have the paradox of transference: in his dream he is going to the analyst driving the analyst himself. And not only this for, in addition, he is now telling his dream to an analyst that he is meeting for the first time. There are, therefore, at least three analysts in this short story: 1) the analyst the subject is driving in his car, the person he cannot see; 2) the analyst he is going to see and of whom he only knows the name; and 3) the analyst as the real person to whom he is telling all of this in the first interview.
It is worth underlining another fact that constitutes the turning point of this whole short story. The real presence of the analyst was necessary to open up the question about the desire of the Other that was included in the dream. The real encounter with an analyst was necessary, and also necessary was the act of speech, the word addressed to the Other, this real act that is impossible to predict, impossible to repeat. It is in this act of speech that the subject realizes the link between his dream and the question of his father’s desire that brought him to the analyst.
In any case, as Lacan posits, transference is at the beginning of psychoanalysis. This is certain in a historical sense: the encounter between the hysterical subject and Freud, the transference addressed to Freud as a person by the hysterical subject, is at the origins of psychoanalysis. But it is also certain in a structural sense: transference is at the beginning of every psychoanalysis; every subject arrives in a certain manner with the psychoanalyst in his car, even if he doesn’t know it. Lacan says somewhere that the question is to know where the analyst already was in the picture that the subject brings with him to the first encounter with the analyst. In the short story I have recounted, this question is very clear, but precisely because it is very clear, it poses the question even more acutely: Where is the real analyst? Which of the three figures of the analyst we have indicated is the most real analyst in the Lacanian sense?
I will answer as follows: none of them taken one by one, but all of them taken as the knot they form in the speech act of the first interview. If the real presence of the analyst is ensured by the person who has listened to the subject in that first interview, if the real analyst is supported by the person who has received the unconscious message of the subject and has confirmed the truth of that message, the message that links the dream with the question of the father’s desire, if this real presence can be ensured by someone, it is because there previously was someone in the back seat of the car and because this car is going somewhere, even if neither the driver, nor the passenger, for the time being, know where.
That is to say that transference is a knot formed by three registers: 1) the symbolic Other, the Big Other, the symbolic place of word and language that is supposed in the subject’s dream but also in the speech act in the first interview; 2) the imaginary other that the subject conceives as his interlocutor in the reality of this interview, 3) the Other reduced to his real, the Other that the subject cannot see in his rear-view mirror nor imagine when he is going to the analyst’s consulting room for the first time.

From this perspective, transference and its paradoxes are something more complex than a simplistic repetition of an original object relation, a repetition to which the post-Freudian analysts had reduced the transference. This reduction was always accompanied by a conception of transference as a dual relation between the patient and the analyst, a dual relation in which the resistance to the analyst’s interpretations and interventions was understood as the most important phenomenon in a non-empathetic relation. On the other hand, the power of transference was impossible to distinguish from the mere action of suggestion as a consequence of the overwhelming presence of this same empathetic relation. It has to be said that the general conception of the so-called “therapeutic alliance” in the Cognitive Behavioral Therapies of our time doesn’t go very far beyond this reductionism.

When Lacan begins his criticism of this reductionist conception in the 1950’s, he shows the complexity of the transference phenomenon by pointing to the three registers we have underlined —the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real— the very three registers that are implied in its structure.
Psychoanalytic interpretation depends on this structure of transference, understood as a knot. Let us quote two short paragraphs from Lacan’s 1958 text “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power”, where he poses this dependence as follows:
“Let me summarize. If an analyst dealt only with resistances, he would look twice before hazarding an interpretation, which he in fact does, but this prudence would suffice.
‘However, this interpretation, if he gives it, will be received as coming from the person the transference imputes him to be. Will he agree to take advantage of this error concerning who he is? Psychoanalytic morals do not forbid it, on the condition that he interpret this effect, failing which the analysis would remain at the level of crude suggestion.”[1]
An interpretation is received as coming from the person the transference imputes the analyst to be. We will see shortly that this imputation is in the first place a supposition, a supposition of knowledge. It is an “error concerning who he is”. In French, Lacan writes “erreur sur la personne”, literally an “error about the person”. It is the “false link” of transference that Freud had pointed out, and that makes it necessary to distinguish the Symbolic register from the Imaginary one.
From the point of view of an objective analysis, transference is an error, a mistake about the person; it is confusion between the Symbolic and the Imaginary places. The subject imputes the analyst to be someone else. And the analyst can only take advantage of this error in his interventions if he, at the same time, interprets this confusion in order to separate the two registers. Maintaining this confusion without interpreting it would reduce psychoanalysis and transference to a “crude suggestion.” Suggestion is, therefore, the reduction of transference to its Imaginary register, a reduction that fails to interpret its effects. Transference in its Symbolic register is the interpretation of suggestion itself. This is what Lacan remarks in his criticism of the general conception of the “therapeutic alliance”.
There is also a paradox in this remark that distinguishes transference and suggestion through the operation of interpretation. How can anyone take advantage of this error about the person and interpret it at the same time? Perhaps this effect could be interpreted in a second moment, but in any case the analyst must be in a certain symbolic place in order to interpret, and, at the same time, he must interpret the imaginary effects, the effects of suggestion, of this same place. In a certain way, the analyst has to exit with his interpretationfrom the same place that makes possible the effects of this interpretation. We can see the extreme paradoxicality of this operation. You might even say that it is impossible, and I would agree, but I would also add that it is by means of this logical impossibility that an interpretation deals with, touches a real point in the subject’s structure.
Let us give a well-known example, a Freudian example, that it is also a Lacanian example, that you will find in a beautiful text written by the American poet and novelist H. D., Hilda Doolittle. The text is entitled “A Tribute to Freud”. In this text, HD remembers her analysis with the famous Professor Sigmund Freud, which she undertook when Sigmund Freud was already in his seventies. There is an anecdote that carries a particular interest for us. HD had sent Freud a bunch of gardenias, his favorite flowers, for his birthday, a gift she never failed to give him on every birthday up until his death. On this occasion, however, she had forgotten to write down her name on the small note that accompanied the bunch of flowers. Freud was not very pleased with this oblivion and he replied back with a letter assuming that it was probably she who had sent the gift, and although he wasn’t sure, he added: “In any case, affectionately yours…” H D also didn’t know what had so suddenly enraged Freud. In her session she spoke with a certain indifference, a certain non-implication, until Freud interrupted her speech by beating with his hand on the head-piece of the couch and uttering the following words: “The trouble is —I am an old man— you do not think it worth your while to love me.” The impact of these words was too dreadful for her to add anything else, and she wondered about the meaning of what Freud meant to say.
Without any doubt, Freud was in a very admired place for Hilda Doolittle, as a professor, as an analyst, and as a man. She writes: “Exactly it was as if the Supreme Being had hammered with his fist on the back of the couch where I had been lying.”[2] With these words, however, the very Supreme Being who exercises such a great power of suggestion over her, speaks from this place to say that she doesn’t consider him to be such a loveable being. At this moment, the Supreme Being exits from its place. There is always, thus, a lie in the love of transference, an idealization of the object. In this sense, one can play with the equivocality of the subject’s words and say that the Supreme Being’s interpretation is beating on the very couch where she has been lying about the object of love.
Freud’s interpretation therefore strikes the subject and awakes her from suggestion, from her demand to be loved, by pointing to her division with the question: What do you want? What is the object of your desire? This is not an interpretation of the transference itself, but an interpretation that leans on transference in order to interpret its effects of suggestion.
We have to distinguish, then, at least two levels of the Other in transference and psychoanalytic interpretation.

            $ — transference —> A
            $ <—interpretation — A


Firstly, there is transference from the subject to the Other, the big Other that will be invested as the Other of transference, “the person the transference imputes [the analyst] to be”. And, secondly, there is the Other of interpretation, the place of the Other from which interpretation takes place, the Other from which the interpretation will be received precisely as an interpretation thanks to the original transference.      
The question may then be posed: is there an Other which could interpret the very transference to the Other that interpretation leans on?
We can see that a nice paradox emerges precisely in this place of the Other that could interpret the transference from within. It is a paradox that is very similar to the well-known paradox of Russell, which questioned the supposed foundation of mathematics upon a naïve set theory. It is the paradox that Bertrand Russell himself illustrated with the example of the barber: "The barber is a man in town who shaves all those, and only those, men in town who do not shave themselves." The question “Who shaves the barber?” results in a paradox that it is impossible to resolve, because according to the above statement, the barber can either shave himself, or go to the barber (who is, of course, none other than himself). Neither of these possibilities are valid: they both result in the barber shaving himself, but he cannot do this because he only shaves those men "who do not shave themselves".
The statement “the analyst that interprets the place of the Other of transference from where interpretation is received” would posit an Other of the Other in the same manner, an Other of interpretation that would contain the Other of transference that makes possible that very interpretation. There is no solution to this paradox, and all the misunderstandings in post-Freudian psychoanalysis concerning transference and counter-transference, concerning the interpretation of transference and the response to counter-transference, are in some way variations of this impossible solution.
            Lacan will take this paradox as a symptom of the particular structure of transference.
In fact, we may say that, properly speaking, there is no interpretation of transference. That is to say, there is no interpretation from a place exterior to the transference relation. Every interpretation operates and obtains its effects from the inner place that transference allocates to the analyst, from the person it “imputes him to be”. On the other hand, however, an interpretation must always be, in a certain way, an interpretation of the effects of suggestion of transference itself. It must use the place of transference in order to interpret the suggestive effects of this interpretation.
An analytic interpretation would ideally work, then, not – as in classical interpretation – as a machine that feeds the subject with more meaning, but instead, in exactly the opposite terms, as a  sort of self-boycotting device, a self-canceling system of meaning. The analytic interpretation made under transference tends to disable the very place of the Other that is, on the other hand, the place where meaning originates with all the suggestive effects of transference itself.

As Jacques-Alain Miller has recently outlined[3], the so called “great secret of psychoanalysis” for Lacan, the great revelation that would open up a new perspective in his teaching, was enounced in his 1959 Seminar “Desire and its interpretation”. This secret, which was a secret for psychoanalysts themselves, was revealed with the following formula: “There is no Other of the Other”.  This turning point, which has also been formulated by Jacques-Alain Miller with the expression “The Other without Other”, was produced at the moment when Lacan began to devalue the symbolic function of the Name of the Father, the signifier that had accomplished till then this role of the Other of the Other, the signifier that had completed and made consistent the place of the Other. Some years later, in 1967, Lacan added another formula constructed in a homologous way: “There is no transference of the transference”[4]. It was his way of showing the exit from the paradox of transference indicated above. There is no Other of the Other of transference, and there even is no Other of the Other of interpretation.

This paradox and its solution lead Lacan to show a hidden face of the transference phenomenon, a phenomenon that seems to be an intersubjective one, that is to say, a phenomenon that occurs between two subjects. Transference was indeed at first conceived by Lacan in his teaching as an intersubjective process, but this supposition was sustained by the idea of the existence of an Other of the Other, and this Other of the Other was the subject itself.
Transference as an intersubjective process, transference to a big Other that would encounter in the subject itself the reciprocity of an Other of the Other, leads to a paradox that is enunciated with the other well-known Lacanian formula for transference: the Subject Supposed to Know.
The “Subject Supposed to Know” is a conclusive version of the paradox of the Other of the Other in transference, or the paradox of the transference of the transference.
And the entire ethical question concerning the use of transference in psychoanalysis revolves around the use of this “Subject Supposed to Know” by the analyst.

What is this “Subject Supposed to Know”? In the first place, it is to suppose a knowledge in the place of the Other, the Other conceived as a subject, as another subject — or, also, as an Other Subject. This is the most superficial level of transference. You take the analyst as a Subject Supposed to Know and there is a good reason to address him. You take the car of your symptom and you drive to the analyst’s address. But there is another analyst in the car of your symptom, the analyst you don’t know but who is the true cause of your transference, or even of your “agalma”, to evoke Lacan’s term in his Seminar on “Transference”. This analyst has no face, no name and no representation. He or she is an object, in the Lacanian sense of the object, and you are driving it without knowing what sort of object it is. You don’t know what this object is, and you don’t know the knowledge contained in this object that concerns you.
At this point, we need to distinguish more carefully between the two French terms for knowledge: “la connaissance” —which is the knowledge of someone in the sense that you may feel that “I don’t know him, I don’t know who he is”— and “le savoir” —which is the knowledge that is supposed, the knowledge the object contains that concerns you and that you don’t know.
There is another knowledge in the back of the car, it is your unconscious knowledge, the knowledge of your symptom, the knowledge you don’t know but that you may suppose if you take it as a formation of your unconscious. As in the case of a dream, you may suppose there is a knowledge articulated even in its meaningless aspect, or you may not. It depends precisely on… transference.
At this point, however, we encounter another face of transference, or even another logic. Transference is transference with your unconscious, transference is to suppose a subject to your unconscious, to suppose that you are concerned as a subject with your unconscious and with your symptom. The logic of transference as Subject Supposed to Know is not, therefore, only or basically to suppose a knowledge to the Other but, first of all, to suppose a subject to the knowledge of your unconscious. You will find this remarked when Lacan introduces this new logic of transference as Subject Supposed to Know, as a criticism of his own initial conception of transference as an intersubjective process. In his inaugural text entitled “The Proposition of the 9th of October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, he says, for example:
“The subject supposed to know is for us the pivot on which everything to do with the transference is hinged. [...] Here the levitator of intersubjectivity will display his finesse in asking: subject supposed by whom, if not by another subject? [And Lacan answers:] A subject supposes nothing, he is supposed. Supposed, I teach, by the signifier that represents him for another signifier.”[5]
The formula of the transference that Lacan proposes in this text follows the logic of this new conception:


We find on the upper level the link between a signifier S, the signifier of the transference, as Lacan points out, a signifier with an unknown meaning, and another signifier Sq, “that we shall call any signifier”, the signifier that represents the analyst at first, his name, for example, to which he is here reduced. We can see the car driving to the analyst in a line reduced to a link between two signifiers, with an unknown meaning. This is the transference at the beginning of analysis, before its development.
On the lower level we also have some signifiers, —S1, S2… Sn— ordered in a series, the series of signifiers of unconscious knowledge. This is the unconscious series of signifiers in the subject’s history that are also in his dream: a car, a father, an unknown passenger, perhaps a debt impossible to pay to this father… In fact, this series of signifiers were already on the upper level reduced, condensed, in a single link, the link of transference. But as a result of the real encounter with the analyst, this series acquires a meaning, a new meaning: the car is not a car, the car is a taxi with a taxi driver who is also a father.
And where is the subject? The subject, Lacan points out, is this small “s”, —“le signifié” in French—, the meaning we suppose to unconscious knowledge, the meaning that was “en souffrance”, in waiting, as the unknown passenger in the transference, the meaning that will only appear in the real encounter with the analyst. The analyst is only a Subject Supposed to Know, but he or she is also the only subject that takes a place in the transference.
That is to say: in the transference relation there is only one subject, supposed to the signifying link, and an object, which the analyst must support in this relation.
That is also to say — there is no intersubjectivity, as is shown in the beautiful poster that announces these Clinical Study Days: the man and the woman, they are not talking to each other, “inter” or between one another, but with an object where a subject may be supposed.

We can now pose a final question: who is the real analyst, the analyst that it is impossible to represent in the car of the symptom, the symptom that leads every subject to an analyst? Perhaps we will find some answers in the works that will be presented in these Clinical Study Days.
In any case, we must take into account this paradox: transference is the unknown passenger of psychoanalysis itself, and the destiny of psychoanalysis is the destiny of this unknown passenger in every psychoanalytical treatment that we conduct.






* I thank Howard Rouse for his proofreading of this text.

[1] Jacques Lacan, Écrits, (The first complete edition in English, translated by Bruce Fink), W.W. Norton & Company, New York – London 2006, page 494.
[2] H.D. A Tribute to Freud: Writing on the Wall-Advent, New Directions Books, New York 1984, page 16.
[3] In his conference “L’Autre sans Autre”, in the NLS Congress, Athens, 19 May 2013.
[4] In his Seminar XV, (29/11/1967). Also in Lacan, Jacques, Autres Ecrits, Paris, Seuil, 2001, page 325: “il n’y a pas de transfert du transfert”.
[5] Jacques Lacan, “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, translated by Russell Grigg.